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Révisé/revised  Avril/April 2008 Abstract:  
We develop a model of a competitive rental housing market with endogenous default 
due to income uncertainty. There is a large number of identical, potential suppliers 
who each face a fixed cost of entering the rental housing market. Those suppliers 
who choose to enter decide how many rental units to supply and the rental price to 
charge. Potential tenants who differ in their income and face an uninsurable income 
shock choose whether to engage in a costly search for rental housing. If they find a 
rental unit, then they must commit to a rental agreement before the income 
uncertainty is resolved. Consequently, some tenants may default on their rental 
payments. We show that tenancy default can explain persistent excess demand in 
the rental housing market without any government price regulations. With excess 
demand in equilibrium, some individuals are simply unable to find rental housing. We 
study both government regulations affecting the cost of default to the housing 
suppliers and the quality of rental units, and the imposition of rent control. We show 
that rent control can have non-standard effects on the access to rental housing and 
on welfare. 
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 1. Introduction
Government regulations are often blamed for the persistent shortage of rental housing.1 In this
paper, we show that if some tenants default on their rent, an equilibrium with excess demand
(i.e. with shortage) can exist in the rental housing market in the absence of any government
regulations. For households at the bottom of the income distribution, the lack of access to
ﬁnancial means can severely restrict their ability to self-insure against adverse shocks.2 Such
households may therefore face a very real risk of defaulting on their rent and being evicted
from their homes in the event of an adverse income shock. Our contribution is to explain how
the possibility of involuntary rental default can translate into a shortage of rental housing in a
competitive housing market.
How important an issue is default in the rental housing market? Unfortunately, there is very
little direct evidence on actual defaults of rental payment. Most of the evidence comes indirectly
through observations on rental housing evictions. However, because there is no central registry
for maintaining information about actual evictions,3 the evidence is generally from records of
forceful evictions where a court-order was applied for and/or issued.4 From these records, we
know that the majority of (forceful) evictions result from the non-payment of rent.5 For example,
in Montreal close to 85% of all complaints ﬁled by landlords cite non-payment of rent as the
reason for the complaint (UN-Habitat Urban Indicators, 2005). As to how many tenants are
1 Price regulations and other forms of rent control that restrict the rental price could generate excess
demand in the rental housing market. Land-use and zoning regulations could also inhibit the
development of new construction and thereby cause an undersupply of rental housing (Arnott,
1995). Other government interventions could also create an undersupply of rental housing. For
example, Quigley and Raphael (2004) argue that government building standards reduced the stock
of aﬀordable rental housing in the US during the 1980s and 1990s.
2 As noted in the Canadian Housing Observer (2006): “Due to their limited incomes, low- and
moderate-income households face greater challenges in addressing their housing needs and in bal-
ancing housing costs against other household expenses.”
3 We are unaware of any such registry in North America.
4 Of course, some tenants might choose to voluntarily leave their homes before being forcefully re-
moved and thus the evidence on evictions might understate the true number of evictions (Hartmann
and Robinson, 2003).
5 See, for example, CMHC (2005) for Canadian evidence and Hartmann and Robinson (2003) for
US evidence. Tenants may also be legally evicted if they are engaging in some form of anti-social
behaviour or if the rental unit is to be renovated or converted to an alternative use.
1being evicted each year, this study indicates that an eviction ratio of about 3% of the rental
stock is standard for most Canadian cities.6 The available evidence suggests that tenants do
default on their rent and are subsequently evicted as a result of rent arrears. It is also worth
noting that the available survey data suggests that the main reason for non-payment of rent
is some unanticipated change in the ﬁnancial circumstances of the household. For example,
over 80% of tenants facing eviction in Toronto in 2002 claimed to be in rent arrears due to
loss of employment income, medical problems, or family breakdowns (Lapointe, 2004). Not
surprisingly, these tenants facing evictions had incomes 30% lower than the average income of
rental households in the city (Lapointe, 2004). Tenants who are not paying their rent as a result
of some unanticipated adverse ﬁnancial shock and who are evicted are lower income households.
Finally, we note that the available evidence suggests that evictions are costly for both the tenant
and the landlord. For example, the average cost to a landlord of evicting a tenant was over $3000
in Canada (CMHC, 2005). Evictions may also have longer term social costs.
In this paper, we incorporate the very real possibility that low-income rental households
who receive an adverse income shock may default on their rent. To do this, we build a model of
the rental housing market in which individuals face some income uncertainty and must commit
to a housing decision before this uncertainty is resolved. Therefore, once their ﬁnal income is
known, some individuals with a rental unit will be unable to pay their rent and will be evicted.
Further, we assume that income is private information. We show that with the possibility
of tenancy default, excess demand can be an equilibrium phenomenon. Increasing supply to
eliminate the excess demand (or, equivalently increasing the rental price) increases the average
probability of default in the rental housing market and may reduce the supplier’s expected proﬁt.
Therefore, it may be in the interest of each proﬁt-maximizing supplier not to increase supply.
As a result, some individuals who choose to look for a rental unit will be unable to ﬁnd one.
Given tenancy default can generate an equilibrium with excess demand, we then examine the
impact of government policies on the housing market. We show that changes in government
policies (e.g. regulation on the quality of housing or regulation impacting the cost of default for
the housing suppliers) may well exacerbate the problem of the lack of aﬀordable rental housing.
We also explain how rent control can have a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent impact when the economy
rests in an equilibrium with excess demand due to tenancy default as opposed to in a standard
6 Similar numbers have been determined for large American cities, see Hartmann and Robinson
(2003). In terms of absolute numbers, for example, 12,300 eviction orders were issued in Toronto
in 2002 (Lapointe, 2004).
2market clearing equilibrium without tenancy default.
That competitive suppliers or demanders may ﬁnd it in their interest to charge an eﬃciency
price diﬀerent from the market-clearing price was established, among others, by Weiss (1980),
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). The paper which is the closest to
ours is Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) in which it is shown that banks may prefer to keep interest
rates on loans at a low level to avoid attracting only high-risk borrowers. In our paper, a similar
“sorting” eﬀect is also present, but it works in the opposite direction for suppliers (landlords):
by charging a low rent, suppliers reduce the probability of default for a given set of tenants,
but they also worsen the pool of tenants as lower rents attract relatively poorer tenants. Our
analysis also diﬀers from Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) by focusing on the rental housing market and
examining the impact of housing market regulations and policies.7 Finally, as will be shown,
in our analysis the level of excess demand aﬀects demand and supply, a phenomenon which is
absent in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).8 As we show, the responses of demand and supply to excess
demand is important in establishing the impact of policies like rent control on the key variables
of interest. Interestingly, Becker (1991) has also noted, but in the rather diﬀerent context of
restaurant pricing, that aggregate demand could aﬀect individual decisions and subsequently
yield excess demand in equilibrium. In his model, individuals are simply assumed to care about
the aggregate demand for a particular good. We instead provide a rationale for why individuals
care about aggregate demand and supply and subsequently why suppliers care about excess
demand as well.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: The next section outlines our model of the rental
housing market. We characterize the equilibrium with excess demand arising in this market in
Section 3. We then examine the impact of government policies aﬀecting the cost of default to
suppliers and the quality of rental housing as well as rent control in Section 4. In Section 5, we
present a numerical example illustrating that an equilibrium with excess demand can exist as
well as some comparative static results. Section 6 brieﬂy concludes.
7 In a pair of papers examining tenancy rent control, Basu and Emerson (2000, 2003) demonstrate
that a similar ‘eﬃciency rent’ can exist when there is private information about how long a tenant
will stay in the rental unit and there is a monopolistic landlord. In their model, individuals are
not allowed to be evicted and there is no tenancy default.
8 Note that in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), labour supply (eﬀort) depends on excess supply (unem-
ployment). However, Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) is a moral hazard model while our model and
that of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) are adverse selection models.
32. The Model
The model we construct should be envisioned as reﬂecting the rental housing market for its
lowest quality segment and for individuals at the bottom of the income distribution, for example
those belonging to the lowest decile of the income distribution. We assume that there are N
individuals who diﬀer in terms of ex ante income y distributed on [y,y] with y > 0 according
to the cumulative distribution G(y) with density G0(y)=g(y) > 0 for all y, and with G(y)=1
and G(y)=0 . 9 Individuals extract utility v from the consumption of housing H and of some
composite good c where
v(H,c)=u(H)+g(c)
with u0 > 0 ≥ u00, g(c)=c for c ≥ co, and g(c) →− ∞for c<c o where co ≥ 0 is some
minimal consumption level of the composite good needed for survival.10 Utility v is assumed to
be bounded below for non-negative levels of housing, that is, v(H,c ≥ co) ≥ v > −∞, ∀ H ≥ 0.
It follows that in choosing their consumption bundle all individuals ensure that c ≥ co.
Final or ex post income is uncertain. Ex ante income y is aﬀected by an i.i.d. shock s
drawn from the cumulative distribution F(s) with density F0(s)=f(s) > 0 for all s, unit mean
E(s) = 1, and support [s,s] with s > 0. Thus, post-shock ﬁnal income of an individual with
ex ante income y who has drawn shock s is simply sy, so expected income is E(sy)=y.W e
assume that this income shock is uninsurable.11 We also assume that both ex ante and ex post
income are private information to the individual.
Individuals must decide whether to look for rental housing. Rental housing can only be
consumed in a single discrete amount h. Individuals who do not have access to a rental unit
9 Total population can therefore be written as N
R y
y dG.
10 Assuming separability simpliﬁes the analysis but the same qualitative results should be obtained
without separability provided vcH > 0.
11 As we are considering individuals at the bottom of the income distribution, it is reasonable to
assume these individuals have limited ability to self-insure against adverse income shocks, that is,
they have no savings and lack the means to borrow money. Adverse income shocks could result from
loss of employment income due to injury or illness, from any increases in the price of necessities, or
from the loss of income from a supporting person or government program. Some of these adverse
shocks may be publicly insured. But even so, there are often waiting times before public beneﬁts
are received and it is during this period with no beneﬁts that default could occur. These issues are
discussed further in Boadway et al. (forthcoming).
4either because they did not look for housing, couldn’t not ﬁnd any, or defaulted on their rent
receive a level of housing ho ≥ 0 which is strictly less than h and is costless.12 Therefore,
H ∈{ ho,h} with h>h o ≥ 0. The actual value of h represents both quality features, such as
location and state of disrepair, and quantity features, such as square footage, of the rental unit.
In what follows, we will assume that the government, through regulation, can aﬀect the value of
h.13 Indeed, as was often done in the past in Canada or in the U.S., a government can increase
the value of h by introducing modiﬁcations to the construction or building code.
The price of rental housing or rent is denoted by r and the price of the composite good is
unity (that is, c is the numeraire). There is a ﬁxed utility cost of looking for housing denoted by
k>0 which could be interpreted as the time it takes to look for housing.14 If individuals search
for a rental unit and are successful in ﬁnding one, then they must sign a lease before shock s
is realized (i.e. before income uncertainty is resolved). We assume that there is no voluntary
default, that is, we assume that the diﬀerence between u(h) and u(ho) is large enough so that
u(h) − k + sy − r>u (ho) − k + sy or u(h) − r>u (ho).15 Individuals only default ex post
because they are forced to. For individuals who ﬁnd rental housing and are lucky enough to
draw a good shock (i.e. those for which sy ≥ r +co), there is no need to adjust H and the ﬁnal
consumption of c is ex post income minus spending on housing: c = sy − r, so ﬁnal utility is
v = u(h) −k +sy −r. However, some individuals draw a bad shock and have to default ex post
on their rent to ensure that they satisfy c ≥ co. This happens if sy < r + co. In this case, H is
12 This alternate housing could be living with family/friends, in a shelter or on the street. The utility
derived from such housing would obviously depend on the speciﬁc alternative.
13 Having the parameter h determined by some form of regulation is not crucial for obtaining an
equilibrium with excess demand. We are, however, interested in determining how such a policy
would aﬀect the rental housing market when there is equilibrium excess demand in the market.
We discuss this issue in more detail later in the paper.
14 Incorporating a positive search cost generates an elastic demand for housing. Alternatively, a
secondary rental housing market with rental units of higher quality/quantity could be assumed.
Having rental units of diﬀering quality, however, would greatly complicate the analysis without
changing the possibility of a market equilibrium with excess demand. Another way to generate
elastic demand would be to assume that there is some utility cost from defaulting on one’s rent.
In this case, both demand and supply would be independent of excess demand in the market but
an equilibrium with excess demand could still be obtained.
15 Also note that there is no moral hazard: individuals cannot aﬀect the value of shock s that they
draw.
5revised to ho,16 ﬁnal consumption is c = sy and ﬁnal utility is v = u(ho) − k + sy. The worst
shock s is assumed to be large enough so that co can always be purchased yet not so large as to
preclude the possibility that any individual may default on their rent.17
It is possible that there will be excess demand in the rental market. If there is excess
demand, then we assume that rental units are allocated randomly according to a pure Bernouilly
mechanism. Let µ denote the probability that an individual will not be allocated a rental unit
given that he has opted to look for housing. This probability will be equal to the proportion of
total demand for rental housing that is not met in equilibrium, i.e. the ratio of excess demand
for rental housing to the total demand for rental housing or the rate of excess demand. The rate
of excess demand, µ, is determined endogenously in equilibrium. Those that look for housing or
demand rental housing, but are unsuccessful at obtaining a rental unit, simply end up consuming
ho and receive ﬁnal utility u(ho) − k + sy.
On the other side of the market, there is a large number of potential risk-neutral suppliers.
All of these potential suppliers are identical, and face a ﬁxed positive cost φ of entering the
housing market.18 A supplier will enter the housing market if their maximized expected proﬁts
are greater than the ﬁxed cost of entry. Once a supplier enters the rental housing market, the
supplier chooses how many rental units to supply and the rental price to charge that maximizes
expected proﬁts. The total cost of producing n housing units of quality/quantity h for any
supplier is hC(n), where C0 > 0, C00 ≥ 0.
Since both ex ante income y and ﬁnal income sy are private information, suppliers can only
charge a single rental price to all of their tenants.19 Further, since all suppliers are identical
there will only be one price in the rental housing market, denoted by r. Suppliers know the dis-
tributions of both income and income shocks. Therefore, suppliers know the average probability
16 Defaulting automatically leads to eviction. Provided defaulting leads to eviction with some prob-
ability between zero and one, our results would continue to hold.
17 The worst shock s is such that the poorest ex post individual will always be able to aﬀord co:
sy ≥ co and the individual will the highest ex ante income who receives this shock will default on
their rent: sy<c o + r.
18 We could allow for heterogeneous entry costs without changing our qualitative results.
19 Re-negotiation of the rent ex post is not possible even if that would be beneﬁcial for the owner and
the tenant given neither income nor the income shock is veriﬁable. Such information is likely to be
diﬃcult and costly to observe.
6of default in the rental housing market. Each supplier recognizes that the probability that their
tenants will default on their rent will depend on the rental price they charge, and take this into
account when they choose their rental price. Suppliers, however, view themselves as having a
negligible eﬀect on total market supply and therefore on excess demand in the market. In other
words, ﬁrms take µ or the rate of excess demand in the market as given.20
The timing of events is as follows:
1. Individuals choose whether to look for housing taking the rental price and the probability
of ﬁnding a rental unit as given. Housing suppliers decide whether to enter the housing
market and upon entry decide on both the number of rental units to supply and the rental
price to charge taking as given the rate of excess demand.
2. Equilibrium in the housing market is obtained which determines the number of suppliers
operating in the housing market, the rental price, the quantity of rental housing supplied
and consumed, and the rate of excess demand in the market.
3. Income shock is realized and individuals who succeeded in ﬁnding a rental unit will default
if sy < co + r.
2.1 Demand Side of the Rental Housing Market
An individual with ex ante income y must decide whether to look for a rental unit. If he chooses




≡ ˆ s(r ,y,c o) (1)
and he will not default if s ≥ ˆ s(r ,y,c o). The cut-oﬀ income shock ˆ s is increasing in both r
and co, and decreasing in y. For a given income level, individuals are more likely to default the
higher the rental price or the higher the minimum consumption level. For a given rental rate,
higher income individuals are less likely to default.
20 Eﬀectively suppliers act as if they can rent as many units as they want at their chosen rental price.
7An individual’s expected utility if he looks for rental housing is given by:
vh =(1 − µ)
(Z ˆ s(r,y,co)
s
[u(ho) − k + sy]dF +
Z s
ˆ s(r,y,co)









The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of the above expression is the expected utility of an
individual when he ﬁnds a housing unit, an event which occurs with probability (1 − µ). In
this case, the individual defaults on his rent for realizations of the shock below ˆ s and does not
consume any rental housing. For realizations of the shock larger than ˆ s, the individual consumes
the rental unit. The second term on the right-hand side of (2) represents the expected utility of
the individual when he cannot ﬁnd a unit, an event which occurs with probability µ.




[u(ho)+sy]dF = u(ho)+y. (3)
Therefore, an individual with a given expected income y will look for rental housing if the
expected utility diﬀerential between looking and not looking for rental housing is non-negative,
vh − vo ≥ 0, or if
(1 − µ)[1 − F(ˆ s(r ,y,c o))][u(h) − r − u(ho)] − k ≥ 0. (4)
We assume there exists some income level in [y,y) such that left-hand side of (4) is equal to
zero. Denote this level of income by ˆ y(r, µ;h).21 Diﬀerentiating the expected utility diﬀerential
given by (4) with respect to y yields:
∂(vh − vo)
∂y




It follows from (5) that all individuals with y ≥ ˆ y(r, µ;h) will look for rental housing and all
individuals with y<ˆ y(r, µ;h) will not search for rental housing. Total demand for rental housing
will be given by D(r, µ;h)=[ 1− G(ˆ y(r, µ;h))]N and will depend on the endogenous variables
21 Our focus is on government policies aﬀecting the quality of rental housing h and the cost of default
to landlords z. Therefore, we suppress the parameters representing the search cost k and the
minimum consumption level co. A full analysis with these parameters is given in the Appendix.
8{r, µ} and the exogenous parameter h. We can now obtain the following partial derivatives (see
Appendix for details):
ˆ yr > 0, ˆ yµ > 0, ˆ yh < 0 (6)
Dr < 0,D µ < 0,D h > 0 (7)
Market demand is decreasing in the rental price. For a given rental rate, individuals are
more likely to look for housing the higher the quality/quantity of the rental housing units, h,
and the lower the probability that an individual does not ﬁnd rental housing given they searched
for rental housing, µ.
2.2 Supply Side of the Rental Housing Market
To solve the problem of the representative housing supplier, we ﬁrst need to establish the default
rate in the rental market. To do this, we simply have to work out the average probability of
default of those individuals who demand rental housing. This average probability of default,
which we denote by π, can be determined by summing up the probability of default for all
individuals who demand rental housing and dividing by the total demand for rental housing.22
Doing this, we obtain:
π(r, µ;h)=
1
















































(1 − G(ˆ y))
#
< 0.
22 The actual size of the population N does not aﬀect the average probability of default as N appears
in both the numerator and denominator of expression on the right-hand side of (8).
9A change in the rental price r has both a direct and an indirect or selection eﬀect on the
average probability of default. These two eﬀects work in opposite directions. The direct eﬀect,
denoted by B1, is positive. An increase in r increases the probability of default for a given set of
tenants. Only r has a direct eﬀect. Any change in the probability of not ﬁnding rental housing,
µ, or the quality of rental housing, h, only has an indirect eﬀect on the average probability of
default. The indirect or selection eﬀect works through changes in the demand for rental housing
or in the set of individuals looking for rental housing, ˆ y. The higher is ˆ y, the higher is the
average income of those looking for rental housing and the lower is the average probability of
default as given by the negative term B2. An increase in µ reduces the demand for housing
whereas an increase in h increases the demand for housing. Therefore, the average probability
of default is decreasing in µ and increasing in h. An increase in r reduces the demand for rental
housing or increases ˆ y which reduces the average probability of default. Therefore, the net eﬀect
of a change in r of the average probability of default is ambiguous.
The interesting case we consider in this paper is the one in which the direct eﬀect on the
average probability of default of an increase in the rental price dominates the selection eﬀect.23
In this case, the average probability of default will be increasing in the rental price. We assume
this to be the case for the remainder of the paper:
Assumption 1: πr > 0
The cost to the supplier of having a tenant default on their rent is denoted by z>0.24 This
could be interpreted as time and/or money cost of evicting tenants, and in what follows, we
assume that the government can inﬂuence this cost through housing market regulations, for
example, by lengthening the procedure for eviction. Consider now a representative supplier who
has chosen to enter the housing market. The representative supplier’s expected proﬁt is given
by:
nR(r, µ;h,z) − hC(n) (10)
23 If the average probability of default was decreasing in the rental rate, then expected revenue per
rental unit would always be increasing in the rental rate and there would never be an equilibrium
with excess demand. Housing suppliers would always want r to be as large as possible.
24 It is possible that z is less than zero so housing suppliers recover some portion of the rent from
tenants who default. In this case, we would have to account for where this money is coming from.
10where
R(r, µ;h,z)=r − π(r, µ;h)(r + z) (11)
is the supplier’s expected revenue per rental unit. Thus, with probability π, the tenant of a
rental unit defaults thereby causing a loss of (r + z) for the supplier of the rental unit. The
representative supplier chooses the number of rental units n to supply and the rental price r to
charge that maximize expected proﬁts. The ﬁrst-order conditions for n and r are
R(r, µ;h,z) − hC0(n)=0 , (12)
nRr(r, µ;h,z)=0 , (13)
respectively. Together the above ﬁrst-order conditions yield the supplier’s supply n(µ;h,z) and
rental rate r(µ;h,z).25 From (13), it is clear that the rental price that maximizes expected
proﬁts is simply the rental price that maximizes expected revenue per rental unit, that is,
r(µ;h,z)i sindependent of the number of rental units supplied. It is also instructive to note
that the expected revenue per rental unit will be decreasing in r for any rental price larger than
r(µ;h,z).
To simplify the exposition for the rest of the paper, we assume that the marginal expected
revenue per rental unit is increasing in µ:26
Assumption 2: Rrµ > 0.
Then, totally diﬀerentiating the above ﬁrst-order conditions, we obtain (see Appendix)
nµ(µ;h,z) > 0,n h(µ;h,z) < 0,n z(µ;h,z) < 0, (14)
rµ(µ;h,z) > 0,r h(µ;h,z) < 0,r z(µ;h,z) < 0. (15)
Supply for a given ﬁrm is increasing in the (endogenous) probability of not ﬁnding a rental
unit, µ, and decreasing in the other exogenous parameters. Increases in µ make it more costly
to look for housing so only those with higher incomes will look for rental units. The average
25 To ensure that the second-order conditions are satisﬁed for a maximum, we assume that Rrr < 0.
26 This assumption is not crucial for our main results and is only required to sign rµ and rh in (15).
See Appendix for details.
11probability of default will be lower and the supplier’s expected revenue per rental unit will be
higher giving the supplier incentive to produce more rental units. Therefore, supply is increasing
in µ. An increase in h will have the opposite eﬀect. Higher quality housing induces more people
to look for housing which increases the average probability of default, and reduces the supplier’s
expected revenue per rental unit. In addition, higher quality housing is more expensive to
produce. Supply will also be decreasing in z since a higher cost of default reduces the expected
return from each rental unit. The expected proﬁt-maximizing rental price is increasing in the
probability of not ﬁnding a rental unit, and decreasing in the quality of rental housing and the
cost of default.
The supplier’s maximized expected proﬁts will be given by
Π(µ;h,z)=n(µ;h,z)R(r(µ;h,z),µ;h,z) − hC(n(µ;h,z)) (16)
where, from the envelope theorem, we have
Πµ(µ;h,z) > 0,Π h(µ;h,z) < 0,Π z(µ;h,z) < 0 (17)
A supplier will enter the rental housing market provided
Π(µ;h,z) − φ ≥ 0 (18)
We now turn to characterizing the equilibrium in the rental housing market.
3. Market Equilibrium with Excess Demand
3.1 Fixed Number of Suppliers
Consider ﬁrst the market equilibrium with a ﬁxed number of suppliers, denoted by m.27 Each
supplier is identical and so chooses the same number of rental units to supply and the same
rental price to charge. Total supply in the market (for a given µ) will be equal to S(m,µ;h,z)=
mn(µ;h,z). We now show that there may exist a rental price in which there is excess demand,
µ>0, in the rental housing and that no ﬁrm has an incentive to charge another price. To save
on notation, we suppress h and z and write market demand as D(r, µ), rental units per supplier
27 One could think about the rental housing market in the very short-run.
12as n(µ), market supply as S(m,µ), and the expected proﬁt maximizing rental price as r(µ). We
now state and prove the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Given a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms m in the rental housing market, there is an
equilibrium with excess demand if D(r(0),0) is greater than S(m,0).
Proof: Consider the case in which there is excess demand at r(0). From (15), the expected
proﬁt maximizing rental price is increasing in µ. Hence, for any µ>0, the expected revenue per
housing unit R(r, µ) is decreasing in r for all r>r (µ). We can pick some ¯ r such that ¯ r>r (µ)




¯ n(¯ r,µ) < ¯ n(¯ r,µ)
we have
noR(r(µ),µ) − hC(no)=¯ n(¯ r,µ)R(¯ r,µ) − hC(no) > ¯ n(¯ r,µ)R(¯ r,µ) − hC(¯ n(¯ r,µ))
where the inequality follows from no < ¯ n(¯ r,µ). So ﬁrms are better oﬀ producing no rental units
at r(µ) then any number of rental units at ¯ r>r (µ). Of course, if the rental price is r(µ), then
each ﬁrm supplies n(µ)=argmaxn nR(r(µ),µ) −hC(n). Thus, by deﬁnition
n(µ)R(r(µ),µ) − hC(n(µ)) ≥ noR(r(µ),µ) − hC (no) > ¯ n(¯ r,µ)R(¯ r,µ) − hC(¯ n(¯ r,µ))
The supplier earns a larger expected unit return and therefore larger expected proﬁts by charging
r(µ) rather than charging any higher rental price even with excess demand in the rental market.
Charging r(µ) and having excess demand in the rental market is consistent with competitive
ﬁrm behaviour.
An equilibrium with excess demand for a ﬁxed number of suppliers is given by some positive
level of µ, denoted by µf, such that:
(1 − µf)D(r(µf),µ f) − S(m,µf) = 0 (19)
where µf(m) is the equilibrium probability that someone looking for a house does not ﬁnd one
and in which all suppliers charge price r(µf(m)). Note that given r(µf) is increasing in µf,
the left-hand side of the equilibrium condition (19) is strictly decreasing in µ. Therefore, there
13should be some µf(m) ∈ (0,1) such that the above condition (19) is exactly satisﬁed.28 This
completes the proof.29
If the condition in Proposition 1 does not hold and supply is greater than demand at µ =0 ,
then there will not be an equilibrium with excess demand. Suppliers would be forced to compete
with one another for tenants and the market equilibrium rental price would be competed down
below r(0).
3.2 Endogenous Number of Suppliers
Now suppose the number of suppliers is determined endogenously as is the case in the long run.
Recall that suppliers enter the market provided their maximized expected proﬁts is greater than
the ﬁxed cost of entry. The equation determining the equilibrium number of suppliers (bringing
back the suppressed notation for h and z)i s
Π(µf(m;h,z);h,z)=φ (20)
which yields m∗(h,z,φ).30 The equilibrium number of suppliers then determines the equilibrium
rate of excess demand given by µ∗(h,z,φ)=µf(m∗(h,z,φ);h,z), which in turns determines
the equilibrium rental rate r∗(h,z,φ)=r(µ∗(h,z,φ);h,z) and the equilibrium market supply
S∗(h,z,φ)=S(m∗(h,z,φ),µ ∗(h,z,φ)). Finally, µ∗ and r∗ determine the equilibrium market
demand given by D∗(h,z,φ)=D(r∗(h,z,φ),µ ∗(h,z,φ),h).
We now state and prove the following proposition.
Proposition 2: Given entry into the rental housing market, there can be a competitive equilib-
rium with excess demand provided the ﬁxed cost of entry is suﬃciently high.
28 Note also that if µf(m) exists it will be unique. For the case when Assumption 2 doesn’t hold
and r(µ) is decreasing in µ, a suﬃcient (non-necessary) condition for excess demand (i.e. the
left-hand side of equation (19)) to be decreasing in µ is that the direct eﬀect of an increase of
µ (i.e. (1 − µ)Dµ − mnµ < 0) outweighs the indirect eﬀect of the increase in µ through r (i.e.
[(1 − µ)Dr]rµ > 0).
29 The above proof is similar in nature to the argument presented in Weiss (1980). Weiss showed
that if the expected revenue from hiring a working is an increasing function of the wage, then
competitive ﬁrms may choose not to lower wages (hire more workers) even when there is excess
supply in the labour market.
30 As shown in the Appendix, how the equilibrium number of suppliers changes with h or z is
ambiguous.
14Proof: From Proposition 1, it has already been shown for any ﬁxed number of ﬁrms m there
can be an equilibrium with excess demand provided D(r(0),0) >S (m,0).
If maximized expected proﬁts were greater than φ when µ = 0, that is, Π(0;h,z) >φ , it would
be proﬁtable for suppliers to continually enter the market and all demand would necessarily be
served. Therefore, such a low φ cannot lead to an equilibrium with excess demand.
Suppose instead maximized expected proﬁts is less than φ when evaluated at µ = 0. Then, given
this large ﬁxed cost of entry, no ﬁrm wants to enter the market. With no ﬁrms in the market,
there is certainly excess demand, which contradicts µ = 0. Therefore, for φ large enough such
that Π(0;h,z) <φan equilibrium must entail µ∗ > 0, i.e. there is an equilibrium with excess
demand.
Remark: A competitive equilibrium with excess demand can exist in our model without gov-
ernment regulation. In the above analysis we have assumed that the quality of rental housing,
h, and the cost of default to suppliers, z, are exogenous and can be inﬂuenced by government
policies. There is no need, however, for speciﬁc values of h or z for Propositions 1 and 2 to hold.
Regarding z, it is easily seen that the analysis above would go through if z = 0. Turning now
to h, the model could be re-formulated so as to endogenize h, but this would have been at the
cost of simplicity and heavy exposition. Alternatively we could re-write the model without h.
All that is required for Propositions 1 and 2 are the following three elements: (i) Two discrete
levels of housing consumption; (ii) The low level of housing is free — or at least cannot lead to
default — while the high level of housing is costly and can lead to default; and (iii) a strictly
positive utility diﬀerential between consuming the low level of housing and consuming the high
level of housing. Thus, if the above analysis was re-written with u(ho)=u0, u(h)=u1 >u 0,
and the supplier’s cost was independent of h, then the above analysis would go through. We are
interested, however, in determining the eﬀect of government policies on a rental housing equi-
librium with excess demand. Therefore, we have chosen to include the exogenous parameters h
and z in our analysis, but again, their inclusion is not required for our Propositions.31
31 A ﬁxed cost of entry is required, however, to obtain an equilibrium with excess demand when there
is entry of suppliers into the rental housing market.
154. Impact of Government Policies
We now examine how changes in government regulations aﬀecting the quality of housing, h, and
the cost of default, z, aﬀect the competitive equilibrium. We begin with the following result:
Result 1: The equilibrium rate of excess demand, µ∗(h,z), is increasing in both the quality of
housing h and the default cost z.
Thus, our analysis is in line with that of Quigley and Raphael (2004): an increase in the quality
of housing can make it more diﬃcult for households to ﬁnd aﬀordable housing. To understand
Result 1, suppose the rental housing market is in an equilibrium with excess demand. From
Propositions 1 and 2, the equilibrium probability that someone looking for a rental unit does not
ﬁnd one, µ∗(h,z) can be determined from the following expression Π(µ∗;h,z)=φ. Determining
how µ∗ is aﬀected by changes in the quality of rental housing, h, and in the cost of default, z,
simply amounts to determining how these parameters (and µ) aﬀect the maximized expected
proﬁts of the housing suppliers. As shown in (17), maximized expected proﬁts are increasing in
µ and decreasing in both h and z. Result 1 follows directly.32
Although we obtain unambiguous comparative statics on the equilibrium value of the prob-
ability of not ﬁnding rental housing, the eﬀect of changes in policies on the equilibrium values
of the rental rate, quantity demanded and quantity supplied are all ambiguous.33 To further
illustrate these comparative statics, we consider changes in the values of z and h in a numerical
example in Section 5. Before doing so, we brieﬂy discuss the impact of rent control.
32 Note also that an increase in the ﬁxed cost will increase the equilibrium rate of excess demand in
the rental housing market which increases the equilibrium number of rental units per supplier. Not
surprisingly an increase in the ﬁxed cost of entry reduces the equilibrium number of suppliers in
the market. This reduction in the number of suppliers more than oﬀsets the increase in the number
of rental units per supplier and total supply of rental units in equilibrium decreases with the ﬁxed
cost of entry. See Appendix for details.
33 The comparative statics on the number of rental units per supplier are unambiguous. An increase
in either z and h has a (negative) direct eﬀect on n and a (positive) indirect eﬀect on n through µ.
In the case of an increase in z, the two eﬀects exactly oﬀset one another and there is no change in
the equilibrium number of rental units per supplier. In the case of an increase in h, the (negative)
direct eﬀect outweighs the (positive) direct eﬀect and the equilibrium number of rental units per
supplier falls. In both cases, the eﬀect on the equilibrium number of suppliers in the rental housing
market is ambiguous and thus total quantity supplied in the market could go up or down with an
increase in either h or z.
164.1 Rent Control
By deﬁnition, rent control imposes a maximal rental price or rent ceiling in the rental housing
market. If rent control is binding, then the rental price ceiling, ¯ r, will be less than the equilibrium
rental price, r∗. The following can be shown.
Result 2: Under a binding rental price ceiling, the rate of excess demand is decreasing in the
regulated rental price, and increasing in both the quality of housing h and the default cost z.
Thus, starting from some equilibrium (with excess demand), imposing rent control will increase
the level of excess demand, but the closer ¯ r is to r∗, the smaller this increase in excess demand.
Interestingly, and as was noted earlier, an increase in the rate of excess demand µ reduces the
rate of default and increases the number of rental units per supplier. Any increase in ¯ r will also
increase rental units per supplier. It turns out that this direct (positive) eﬀect of an increase
in ¯ r on n will exactly oﬀset the (negative) indirect eﬀect through µ. Consequently, the number
of rental units per supplier does not change. The eﬀect of an increase in ¯ r on the equilibrium
number of suppliers is ambiguous and thus, paradoxically, rent control and its associated increase
in µ can lead to an increase in market supply and to an increase in the quantities exchanged.
These eﬀects are absent in the standard microeconomic textbook analysis of rent control since
it ignores the possibility of tenancy default. Such an analysis can therefore lead to an incorrect
assessment of the full (welfare) impact of rent control. We come back to this in our numerical
example.
5. Numerical Example
We construct a numerical example to conﬁrm that an excess demand equilibrium can be obtained
in our competitive economy and further to illustrate the impact government policies have on
both the rental housing market and social welfare.
We consider a very simple economy of the type described in previous sections. The following
speciﬁc functional forms are assumed:
￿ The total number of individuals in the economy is N = 100;
￿ The utility of housing is given by u(h)=αh;
17￿ The distribution of income is uniform on the interval [y,y];
￿ The distribution of shocks is uniform on the interval [s,s];
￿ The cost of producing n housing units of quality h is hn2/2.













The parameters are set as follows: y =2 ;y =4 ;s =0 .8; s =1 .2; co =0 .5; k =0 .1; h =0 .8;
ho =0 ;z =0 .1; φ =1 .982; and α =4 .5.
The level of excess demand is denoted by E = D − S. The rate of homelessness (or,
the proportion of individuals without rental housing) is denoted by M. There are three reasons
individuals are without rental housing: they did not look for rental housing [N −D], they looked
for rental housing but were unable to ﬁnd any [µD = E], or they looked for and found rental
housing but defaulted on their rent and were evicted [D(1 − µ)π]. Thus, M =1− (D/N)+
(D/N)(µ +( 1− µ)π).36 One could interpret this measure as reﬂecting the extent of the lack of
access to rental housing.
Over the past several years public attention has increasingly focused on the issue of ‘af-
fordable rental housing’ and its presumed shortage. It is worth distinguishing between the lack
of access to ‘aﬀordable’ rental housing and the lack of access to rental housing as described
above. In the former case, individuals might be able to aﬀord to rent homes at the current
34 In equilibrium, the suppliers’ expected proﬁts from operating exactly oﬀset their ﬁxed costs of
entering the housing market. Therefore, suppliers do not receive any weight in the social welfare
function. If we had heterogeneous ﬁxed costs, then all the infra-marginal suppliers would be earning
positive returns and would have to be given some weight in the social welfare function.
35 As shown in the Appendix, we are unable to obtain unambiguous analytical comparative statics on
social welfare and therefore rely on the numerical examples to illustrate how the various parameters
aﬀect social welfare. A more general social welfare function could have been used without much
gain in terms of understanding.
36 Since D =( 1− G(ˆ y))N, the rate of homelessness will be independent of the size of the population
since, as shown in the Appendix, the equilibrium levels of µ and r which aﬀect ˆ y do not change
with N.
18prices but doing so puts a ﬁnancial strain on them. For example, Quigley and Raphael (2004)
document the trends in the aﬀordability of rental housing in the US over the last 40 years by
calculating both the ratio of the median rent to the median income of rental households and the
proportion of rental households spending more than 30% of their income on rent.37 To relate
our model to the discussion about access to ‘aﬀordable’ housing, we calculate the ratio of the
average income of those who look for rental housing to the equilibrium rent and denote this
ratio by A =[ ( ˆ y+¯ y)/2]/r. Clearly, the larger is A, the smaller the ﬁnancial strain on those who
consume rental housing and the more aﬀordable is the available rental housing. Of course, the
average rate of default π also reﬂects to some extent the ‘unaﬀordability’ of rental housing.
Table 1
Benchmark, Impact of Government Policies and Rent Control §
Variable µr † DS mn π MAW
(a) Benchmark
0.083 1.916 97.110 89.044 40 2.226 0.067 0.169 1.587 430.182
(b) Impact of Government Policies, Changes in h and z
1% ↑ in h 0.260 1.934 95.793 70.837 31.98 2.215 0.071 0.342 1.575 402.354
++— — — — ++— —
1% ↑ in z 0.084 1.915 97.130 88.910 39.94 2.226 0.066 0.170 1.587 430.061
+— +— — n / c — ++—
(c) Impact of Imposing Rent Control, Maximal Rent Set at Level ¯ r
¯ r = 99% r∗ 0.085 1.896 97.944 89.534 40.22 2.226 0.058 0.156 1.595 433.835
+— +++n / c — — ++
¯ r = 97% r∗ 0.108 1.858 99.569 88.755 39.87 2.226 0.039 0.147 1.618 438.474
+ —+ ——n / c ——+ +
§: A “+” indicates an increase in the variable, a “—” indicates a decrease, and “n/c” indicates no change, relative
to the initial values in the benchmark.
†: For Parts (a) and (b), the reported r is the equilibrium r, i.e. r∗. For Part (c), the reported r corresponds
to ¯ r set at a proportion of the benchmark r∗ given in the corresponding line.
Before we proceed, recall that one should view what follows as an example of the rental housing
37 Similar statistics are also used to measure aﬀordability in the Canadian rental housing market
(CHMC, 2007).
19market for the lowest quality of housing available in a given market — that for which regulated
minimal quality requirements would be a binding constraint. Also, the set of individuals we
are focusing on is the segment of the population with the lowest income, for example, those
belonging to the lowest decile of the income distribution.
In Part (a) of Table 1, we report the values of several variables in our benchmark equilibrium.
One of the main message of this paper is that excess demand, i.e. a lack of access to rental
housing, can be an equilibrium phenomenon in the housing market. Part (a) of Table 1 conﬁrms
that such an equilibrium can exist. Indeed, our benchmark equilibrium is characterized by a rate
of excess demand (µ∗) of 8.3%. Note that pinning down a competitive equilibrium with excess
demand was not diﬃcult — such equilibria result for a large set of parameter values. Thus, the
example we report is simply an illustration. In this example, there are 40 suppliers operating
and each of them provide 2.226 housing units.38 The maximal demand is for 100 units,39 but
because of the search cost, only 97.110 units are demanded. Out of those 97.110 units demanded,
only 89.044 will be served (hence a rate of excess demand of 8.3%). Further, for the 89.044 units
for which a transaction takes place, there is a possibility of default. With a rate of default of
6.7%, there will be default in 5.965 units. Thus, the rate of homelessness is at 16.9% [= 2.890
(no demand) + 8.066 (excess demand) + 5.965 (default)]. As for our aﬀordability measure A of
housing expenditures, note that the equilibrium rent represents 63.2% of the average income of
those who demand housing as given by 1/A.40
In Part (b) of Table 1, we report the impact of government policies aﬀecting housing quality
and the cost of default for an economy initially resting in the benchmark. Thus, Part (b) indicates
the direction of the change in a variable from its original value in Part (a). The ﬁrst row in Part
(b) shows that an increase in housing quality h, as observed in the 1980s and the 1990s when
more stringent regulation of the housing construction industry was enacted by governments
(Quigley and Raphael, 2004) could have exacerbated the problem of access to rental housing
38 As in the model, we are allowing for the number of rental units to be a continuous variable.
39 As shown in the Appendix, the size of the population N only aﬀects the equilibrium number of
suppliers in the market. If population was increased by x%, the equilibrium number of landlords,
m, would also increase by x%, while the other variables would remain at the equilibrium values
reported in Part (a) of Table 1.
40 For the very poorest segment of the population, this number is plausible. For example, in 2004, the
average housing cost to income ratio of the 20 per cent of households in Canada with the lowest
income was over 40% (CHMC, 2007).
20as measured by the increase in π (defaulting) and M (no consumption of housing) and the
reduction in A (aﬀordability).41 These facts, together with the fact that an increase in h leads
to an increase in the equilibrium rental price, explain why welfare goes down as the quality of
rental housing goes up. Thus, a regulated increase in the minimal quality of housing could have
led to a deterioration of the housing market for the relatively poor segment of the population.
Consider now the impact of increased protection of tenants from eviction which increases
the cost of default to suppliers, z. Increased protection could come about from the imposition of
a legal delay before a tenant can be evicted, or by forbidding eviction in the winter. Such policies
are often observed in practice. The numerical analysis shows that increasing the protection of
tenants from eviction lowers the equilibrium rent. In terms of access to aﬀordable housing, the
results are mixed: the probability of default (π) goes down and aﬀordability (A) improves, but
the rate of homelessness (M) increases as a result of the contraction in supply. An increase in
tenant protection, however, ultimately leads to a decrease in welfare.
In Part (c) of Table 1, we report the impact, relative to the benchmark in Part (a), of
implementing a rental price ceiling equal to 99% of the equilibrium rent. As was explained
in Section 4, rent control leads to an increase in µ — this is expected when rent control is
implemented. What is more surprising, and completely contrary to the standard analysis, are
the other columns of Part (c) in Table 1. In this example, rent control leads to more rental units
being supplied (and thus exchanged), to a lower probability of default, to less homelessness, to
increased aﬀordability, and, ultimately, to an increase in welfare. Further, note that an increase
in total supply is not necessary for rent control to be welfare improving. Indeed, when the
maximal rent is set at 97% of equilibrium rent, total supply goes down, but because of the lower
price, reduced homelessness and improved aﬀordability, welfare increases. Our key message here
is that rent control should be analyzed taking into account the possibility that tenants may
default on their rent and, consequently, that demand and supply will both adjust to the excess
demand in the rental housing market. Further, the standard textbook prescriptions — that rent
control is detrimental to tenants because it creates excess demand — may not be valid in a
competitive housing market equilibrium when one introduces the possibility of tenancy default.
As we have just illustrated, any increase in the rate of excess demand in the market can be more
than compensated for by the lower rental rate and the accompanying improvement in terms of
41 Similar links between the minimum quality of rental housing and homelessness have been empiri-
cally documented (Quigley et al., 2001).
21aﬀordability.
6. Concluding Remarks
We have shown that if some tenants involuntarily default on their rent, then a competitive market
equilibrium could exhibit excess demand in the absence of government interventions. Tenant
default could explain the shortage of rental housing. Further, we have shown that a regulated
increase in the minimal quality of rental housing, observed in the 1980s and the 1990s when
more stringent regulation of the housing construction industry was enacted by governments,
could have exacerbated the lack of access to aﬀordable housing. Similarly, an increase in the
protection of tenants from eviction, by imposing a delay before a tenant can be evicted, or by
forbidding eviction in the winter, leads to less households ﬁnding a rental unit. However, such
an increase in protection also leads to a lower equilibrium rent, which in turn translates into
better aﬀordability according to measures like the probability of default or the ﬁnancial strain
put on those who do rent.
Introducing the possibility of tenancy default leads to surprising implications regarding the
impact of rent control. Recall that in the standard textbook world, under perfect competition
and with no possibility of default, rent control is generally presented as a bad policy as it
generates excess demand and it reduces the number of rental units exchanged. As our analysis
showed, things are not so simple when tenancy default is introduced in an otherwise competitive
environment. The main reason is that in our framework, the rate of excess demand in the
market directly aﬀects demand and indirectly aﬀects the supply through the average probability
of default. Thus, introducing rent control creates excess demand, which in turn increases supply.
As we showed in our numerical example, rent control can lead to a larger quantity supplied (and
thus exchanged), to a lower probability of default, to less homelessness, to better aﬀordability,
and, ultimately, to an increase in welfare. So rent control may be a good policy in the presence
of tenancy default.
There are several housing policies we did not consider in this paper. For example, the frame-
work we developed could be used to study the provision of public housing, rental allowances,
and rental subsidies. Some of these policies would require ﬁnancing, so extra ingredients would
have to be added to our model to account for this requirement. We leave these investigations
for future research.
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24Appendix
Section 2.1: Comparative Statics of Market Demand
To determine how market demand changes with the various parameters, we can diﬀerentiate
vh−vo given by the expression on the left-hand side of (4) with respect to the various parameters.
∂(vh − vo)
∂r
= −(1 − µ)[u(h) − r − u(ho)]f(ˆ s)
1
y
− (1 − µ)[1 − F(ˆ s)] < 0,
∂(vh − vo)
∂µ
= −[1 − F(ˆ s)][u(h) − r − u(ho)] < 0,
∂(vh − vo)
∂co






= −1 < 0,
∂(vh − vo)
∂h
=( 1− µ)[1 − F(ˆ s)]u0(h) > 0.
(A1)





1 − F(ˆ s)
[u(h) − r − u(ho)]f(ˆ s)(ˆ s/y)
> 0, ˆ yµ =
1 − F(ˆ s)
(1 − µ)f(ˆ s)(ˆ s/y)






(1 − µ)[u(h) − r − u(ho)]f(ˆ s)(ˆ s/y)
> 0, ˆ yh = −
[1 − F(ˆ s)]u0(h)
[u(h) − r − u(ho)]f(ˆ s)(ˆ s/y)
< 0
(A2)
which yields (6). Then, from the deﬁnition of market demand D =[ 1− G(ˆ y)]N it follows that
Dr = −g(ˆ y)ˆ yrN<0,D µ = −g(ˆ y)ˆ yµN<0,D N =1− G(ˆ y) > 0
Dco = −g(ˆ y)ˆ ycoN<0,D k = −g(ˆ y)ˆ ykN<0,D h = −g(ˆ y)ˆ yhN>0
(A3)
which yields (7).
Section 2.2: Comparative Statics of the Supplier’s Problem
To determine how the average probability changes with the various parameters, we diﬀerentiate
(8) to obtain:































(1 − G(ˆ y))
#
< 0
which yields (9). We now state and prove the following Lemma.
25Lemma 1: If πr > 0, then πco > 0.
Proof:
From (A2), ˆ yr > ˆ yco > 0 which implies from (A4) that πr <π co. Therefore, if πr > 0 it follows
that πco > 0. Therefore, we have Lemma 1.
To determine how the supplier’s optimal choice of n and r changes with the various parameters,
we ﬁrst diﬀerentiate the supplier’s expected revenue per rental unit R(r, µ;co,k,h,z) given by
(11). Doing this and using (A4), Assumption 1 and Lemma 1, we obtain
Rr =( 1− π) − (r + z)πr> <0,R µ = −(r + z)πµ > 0,
Rco = −(r + z)πco < 0,R k = −(r + z)πk > 0,
Rh = −(r + z)πh < 0,R z = −π<0
(A5)
It is also instructive to determine how the marginal expected revenue per rental unit Rr changes
with the various parameters. Using the expression for Rr(r, µ, co,k,h,z) from (A5) and diﬀer-
entiating, we have
Rrr = −2πr − (r + z)πrr,R rz = −πr < 0,R rj = −πj − (r + j)πrj (A6)
for j = µ,co,k,h.
We now state and prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 2: If Rrµ > 0, then Rrk > 0 and Rrh < 0.
Proof:
Using (A2) and (A4) and given that the order of diﬀerentiation is irrelevant for cross-partials,
we have that
πrµ = πµr =
dB2
dr
ˆ yµ + B2ˆ yµr,π rk = πkr =
dB2
dr
ˆ yk + B2ˆ ykr,π rh = πhr =
dB2
dr
ˆ yh + B2ˆ yhr
We can write the expression for ˆ yr as follows:







u(h) − r − u(ho)
ˆ y
where H(ˆ s)=( 1 − F(s))/f(s), ˆ s =( co + r)/y and ˆ y(r, µ, co,k,h). We do not make any
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26We can then determine the following second partial derivatives:
ˆ yrµ =ˆ yµr =( Yˆ sˆ sy + Yˆ y)ˆ yµ
ˆ yrk =ˆ ykr =( Yˆ sˆ sy + Yˆ y)ˆ yk
ˆ yrh =ˆ yhr =( Yˆ sˆ sy + Yˆ y)ˆ yh + Yh
Using the above, we have






























































+ B2 (Yˆ sˆ sy + Yˆ y)
￿￿
+( r + z)B2Yh
Since ˆ yrµ/ˆ yµ =ˆ yrk/ˆ yk,ˆ yµ > 0 and ˆ yk > 0, it follows that πµ +( r + z)πrµ < 0 if and only
if πk +(r +z)πrk < 0. Given ˆ yµ > 0 and ˆ yh < 0, the condition πµ +(r +z)πrµ < 0 implies that
πh +( r + z)πrh > 0. Therefore, we have Lemma 2.
In what follows, we focus, without loss of generality, on the case in which the eﬀect on the
average probability of default dominates the eﬀect on the marginal probability of a change in µ.
Assumption 2: Rrµ > 0.
By Lemma 2, we can then sign Rrk and Rrh. The sign of Rrco, however, remains ambiguous.
We can now turn to determining how a representative supplier’s choice of rental units and rental
price change with the various parameters. The ﬁrst order conditions are of the representative
supplier’s problem are
R(r, µ;co,k,h,z) − hC0(n)=0
nRr(r, µ;co,k,h,z)=0
27Together, the above conditions yield ˜ n(µ;co,k,h,z) and ˜ r(µ;co,k,h,z). Totally diﬀerentiating










−Rµ −Rco −Rk −Rh + C0(˜ n) −Rz















Applying Cramer’s Rule and assuming that Rrr < 0 we obtain the following total partial deriva-
tives
˜ rµ = −
Rrµ
Rrr




˜ rk = −
Rrk
Rrr
> 0, ˜ rh = −
Rrh
Rrr















> 0, ˜ nh =
Rh − C0(˜ n)
hC00(˜ n)





where we have used the ﬁrst-order condition ˜ nRr = 0 and Assumption 2. The signs follow from
(A5), (A6) and Lemma 2.
The supplier’s maximized expected proﬁt is given by
Π(µ,co,k,h,z)=˜ n(µ,co,k,h,z)R(˜ r(µ,co,k,h,z),µ,c o,k,h,z) − hC(˜ n(µ,co,k,h,z)) (A9)
Diﬀerentiating and using (A5), we obtain
Πµ =˜ nRµ > 0,Π co =˜ nRco < 0,Π k =˜ nRk > 0,Π h =˜ nRh − C(˜ n) < 0,Π z =˜ nRz < 0
(A10)
Section 3: Comparative Statics of Market Equilibrium
Section 3.1: Fixed Number of Suppliers
The equilibrium with excess demand and a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms, denoted by m, can be repre-
sented by the following condition:
(1 − µf)D(˜ r(µf,c o,k,h,z),µ f,N,c o,k,h) − m˜ n(µf,c o,k,h,z)=0
28which yields µf(m,N,c o,k,h,z). Totally diﬀerentiating the above, and using Assumption 2,




































Φ = D − (1 − µ)[Drrµ + Dµ]+m˜ nµ > 0.
Section 3.2: Endogenous Number of Suppliers
The condition determining the equilibrium number of suppliers is given by
Π(µf(m,N,c o,k,h,z);co,k,h,z)=φ







































where Ψ = −Πµµf
m > 0
The equilibrium number of suppliers m∗(N,co,k,h,z,φ) determines the proportion of demand
not being met in equilibrium given by µ∗(N,co,k,h,z,φ)=µf(m∗(·),N,c o,k,h,z) which in
turn determines the equilibrium rental price r∗(co,k,h,z,φ)=˜ r(µ∗(·);co,k,h,z) and the equi-
librium number of rental units each supplier produces, n∗(co,k,h,z,φ)=˜ n(µ∗(·);co,k,h,z).
Finally, the equilibrium rental rate r∗(·) and µ∗(·) determines the demand for rental housing
D∗(N,co,k,h,z,φ)=D(r∗(·),µ ∗(·);N,co,k,h).
Section 4: Comparative Statics of Government Policies
The proportion of demand not being met in equilibrium is given by
µ∗(N,co,k,h,z)=µf(m∗(N,co,k,h,z),N,c o,k,h,z).










































Therefore, we have Result 1. Note, also that the size of the population N has no eﬀect on the
equilibrium rate of excess demand and therefore will also not aﬀect either the equilibrium rental
price or the equilibrium number of rental units per supplier. Given total supply is equal to
mn, it follows from (A3) and (A12) that any increase in N increases the equilibrium number of
suppliers to exactly meet the increase in demand. We can also determine how the equilibrium




N =0 ,n ∗
co =˜ nµµ∗
co +˜ nco =0 ,n ∗
k =˜ nµµ∗
k +˜ nk =0
n∗
h =˜ nµµ∗
















N =0 ,r ∗
co =˜ rµµ∗
co +˜ rco> <0,r ∗
k =˜ rµµ∗
k +˜ rk =0
r∗
h =˜ rµµ∗
h +˜ rh> <0,r ∗
z =˜ rµµ∗




From (A12) and (A14), it follows that the equilibrium quantity of rental housing supplied
in the market is increasing in k. It can also be shown that it is decreasing in the ﬁxed cost of
entry, φ.
Section 4.1: Rent Control
We assume that the rental price ¯ r imposed is such that ¯ r<r ∗(co,k,h,z,φ). Given the properties
of the expected revenue per rental unit, Rr > 0a tr =¯ r. A supplier’s ﬁrst-order condition on
n given a maximal rental price ¯ r is given by
R(¯ r,µ;co,k,h,z) − hC0(n)=0
which yields ¯ n(¯ r,µ;co,k,h,z) where ¯ nj =˜ nj for j = µ,co,k,h,zand ¯ n¯ r = Rr/(hC00(¯ n)) > 0.
The supplier’s maximized expected proﬁt is given by
¯ Π(¯ r,µ,c o,k,h,z)=¯ n(·)R(¯ r,µ;co,k,h,z) − hC(¯ n(·))
where ¯ Π¯ r =¯ nRr > 0 and ¯ Πj = Πj for j = µ,co,k,h,z.
30The equilibrium with excess demand and a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms, denoted by m, with rent
control can be represented by the following condition:
(1 − ¯ µf)D(¯ r, ¯ µf,c o,k,h) − m¯ n(¯ r, ¯ µf;co,k,h,z)=0




Φ0 < 0, ¯ µ
f
¯ r =
(1 − µ)D¯ r − m¯ n¯ r
Φ0 < 0, ¯ µf
co =






(1 − µ)Dk − m¯ nk
Φ0 > 0, ¯ µ
f
h =
(1 − µ)Dh − m¯ nh






Φ0 = D − (1 − µ)Dµ + m¯ nµ > 0.
The condition determining the equilibrium number of suppliers is given by
¯ Π(¯ µf(m, ¯ r,c o,k,h,z);co,k,h,z)=φ





¯ r + ¯ Π¯ r
Ψ0
> <0, ¯ m∗
co =
¯ Πµ¯ µf
co + ¯ Πco
Ψ0










h + ¯ Πh
Ψ0
> <0, ¯ m∗
z =
¯ Πµ¯ µf
z + ¯ Πz
Ψ0





where Ψ0 = − ¯ Πµ¯ µf
m > 0
The equilibrium number of suppliers ¯ m∗(¯ r,c o,k,h,z,φ) determines the proportion of demand
not being met in equilibrium given by ¯ µ∗(¯ r,c o,k,h,z,φ)=¯ µf(¯ m∗(·),c o,k,h,z) which in turn
determines the equilibrium number of rental units each supplier produces, ¯ n∗(¯ r,c o,k,h,z,φ)=
¯ n(¯ r, ¯ µ∗(·);co,k,h,z) and the equilibrium demand for rental housing ¯ D∗(¯ r,c o,k,h,z,φ)=
D(¯ r, ¯ µ∗(·);co,k,h).
Totally diﬀerentiating the equilibrium proportion of demand not being met in equilibrium yields
¯ µ∗
¯ r =¯ µf
m ¯ m∗
¯ r +¯ µ
f
¯ r =
− ¯ Π¯ r
¯ Πµ





































Therefore, we have Result 2.
31It follows from the above expressions for ¯ n¯ r and ¯ Π¯ r, and from (A8) and (A18) that ¯ n∗ does
not change with ¯ r, i.e. ¯ n∗
¯ r =¯ n¯ r+¯ n¯ µ¯ µ∗
¯ r = 0. From (A17), ¯ m∗ may increase or decrease in ¯ r. This
implies that the total supply of rental housing could be increasing or decreasing in the maximal
rental ceiling.
Section 5: Social Welfare

























[u(h) − r − u(ho)] − k
￿
g(ˆ y)=0 .
Consider now the partial eﬀect of a change in the rental price r and the probability of not ﬁnding
rental housing µ. We have
∂W(r, µ;h)
∂r
= −(1 − µ)N
Z y
ˆ y






(1 − F(ˆ s))[u(h) − r − u(ho)]dG < 0 (A20)
An increase in r or µ reduces social welfare. From Result 1, we know that an increase in h or z
will increase µ and thus reduce social welfare. The impact on the equilibrium rental rate r∗ of
an increase in either h or z is ambiguous and therefore we are unable to determine the indirect











Given the above analysis, it is clear that we will be unable to say anything conclusive about
the total welfare eﬀects of a change in policies when the economy is in an equilibrium with excess
demand. Therefore, we rely on numerical examples to illustrate these comparative statics.
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